Authors:
Jouma Ali Al-Mohamad, S. S. Rajest, C. Suvan Mathew, Tan Haoran, Fang Zihan, Ahmed J. Obaid
Addresses:
Department of Computer and Mobile Communication Engineering, Faculty of Information Engineering, Al-Shahbaa Private University, Aleppo, Syria. Department of Information Systems, Girne American University, University Avenue, Karmi Campus, Karaoğlanoğlu, Northern Cyprus. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Galway, University Road, Galway, Ireland. Department of Information Technology and Engineering, Jingwei Software Co., Beijing, China. Department Research and Development, Taihu Advanced Materials, Jiangsu, China. Department of Computer Science, Faculty of Computer Science and Mathematics, University of Kufa, Kufa, Najaf Governorate, Iraq.
Syria's offensive and defensive cyber capabilities face significant and complex difficulties after the Assad regime's fall in December 2024. Syria is at a critical point where cyber power is essential for state sovereignty, economic recovery, and national security after nearly fourteen years of civil war that fragmented the country's security apparatus, depleted its human capital, and exposed its digital infrastructure to relentless exploitation. This study identifies and examines five main difficulties using securitization theory, state-building frameworks, and empirical evidence from Syria's post-conflict cyber landscape: The fragmented legacy of offensive cyber assets, the degraded defensive infrastructure, multifaceted external threats, institutional consolidation and regulatory reform, and geopolitical complexities of strategic alliance development. The SEA was the main example of offensive cyber capabilities developed and used by the Assad regime to survive rather than defend the nation. However, defense skills were ignored, exposing vital national infrastructure to threat. The transitional administration inherited a cyber environment where military fragmentation is replicated in cyberspace, pro-regime hacking organizations pose grave dangers, and state cybersecurity skills are insufficient to defend even basic systems. The study also examines strategic partnerships with regional cybersecurity providers, the creation of a National Cybersecurity Strategy, the creation of institutional frameworks like NAITS, and the return of Syrian exile technical talent. The paper ends with concrete advice for policymakers, foreign partners, and cybersecurity practitioners striving to develop a cohesive, resilient, and effective national cyber capability in one of the most difficult post-conflict circumstances of the 21st century.
Keywords: Cyber Capabilities; Offensive Cyber; Defensive Cyber; Syrian Electronic Army (SEA); National Security; State-Building; National Cybersecurity Strategy; Cyber Environment.
Received on: 11/09/2025, Revised on: 20/11/2025, Accepted on: 27/12/2025, Published on: 11/09/2026
DOI: 10.69888/FTSIS.2026.000805
FMDB Transactions on Sustainable Intelligence and Security, 2026 Vol. 1 No. 3, Pages: 182-198