Rebuilding National Cybersecurity: The Challenge of Transitioning from Systems Protection to State-Level Defense

Authors:
Mihiro Otaki, Jouma Ali Al-Mohamad, Cheang Chi Seng, Mark Benjamin Kuhne, Lejla Skelic, Chang Shi Ying

Addresses:
Department of Information and Communication Engineering, University of Tokyo, Bunkyo, Tokyo, Japan. Department of Computer and Mobile Communication Engineering, Faculty of Information Engineering, Al-Shahbaa Private University, Aleppo, Aleppo Governorate, Syria. Department of Computing and Information Systems, Singapore Management University, 81 Victoria Street, Singapore. Department of Computer Science, Secure and Trustworthy Systems Group, ETH Zurich, Zürich, Switzerland.

Abstract:

This paper examines the profound challenges Syria faces in transitioning from a regime-centric cybersecurity paradigm to a comprehensive national defense framework following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. After nearly fourteen years of civil war that systematically degraded the country's digital infrastructure and institutional capacity, Syria stands at a critical inflection point where cybersecurity has emerged as a fundamental prerequisite for state legitimacy, economic recovery, and national sovereignty. This study examines five main challenges: regime-centric cybersecurity, fragmented hacker networks and persistent threats, degraded digital infrastructure and institutional capacity, sanctions-induced technological isolation, and the geopolitical dimension of digital sovereignty, using securitisation theory, critical infrastructure protection frameworks, and empirical evidence from Syria's post-conflict digital landscape. Cybersecurity was narrowly used for political repression and regime survival under the Assad dictatorship, leaving national infrastructure vulnerable. In the transitional government's digital ecosystem, national cybersecurity capabilities are insufficient to safeguard even basic systems, hacker organisations loyal to the past regime pose risks, and the military and security apparatus is fractured. The report also examines strategic relationships with regional cybersecurity providers, the establishment of a National Cybersecurity Strategy, revoking accreditations to enforce digital sovereignty, and the return of Syrian exile technical talent. This paper concludes with concrete advice for politicians, international partners, and cybersecurity practitioners working to build a robust national cybersecurity framework in one of the 21st century's most difficult post-conflict circumstances. 

Keywords: National Cybersecurity; Digital Sovereignty; Critical Infrastructure Protection; Digital Infrastructure; Institutional Capacity; Political Repression; Transitional Government.

Received on: 14/09/2025, Revised on: 13/12/2025, Accepted on: 16/01/2026, Published on: 11/11/2026

DOI: 10.69888/FTSCL.2026.000843

FMDB Transactions on Sustainable Computer Letters, 2026 Vol. 4 No. 4, Pages: 227-243

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